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ARE CATHOLIC BISHOPS SEEKING A 
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE OR RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM? 
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER* 
Using the Catholic Bishops’ litigation strategy in challenging the 
Affordable Care Act as an example, this Article suggests that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment religion clauses has 
emboldened religious organizations to seek preferred treatment, i.e., “to 
become a law unto [themselves].”  The religion clauses have a common 
goal, religious freedom, but they are often in tension and require a 
delicate balance.  Beginning with the Rehnquist Court, and continuing 
with the Roberts Court, the interpretation of the religion clauses, in 
combination with the free speech clause, has eliminated the wall of 
separation between religion and government.  The wall has been replaced 
by an open border.  As a result, government is heavily involved in 
subsidizing religion and religion is heavily involved in utilizing the 
government subsidy while attempting to exempt itself from government 
rules with which it disagrees. 
Well-funded religious institutions and their advocacy groups, 
operating under the banner of religious freedom, are doing exactly what 
was forecast by the Court in Reynolds nearly 140 years ago—seeking to 
exempt themselves from religion-neutral laws of general applicability.  
The Catholic Bishops and their allied religious institutions want to, for 
example, become large employers in the public square but not abide by 
the rules that govern other public square employers.  They want to be free 
to discriminate, particularly based on gender; they want to enlist the help 
of government in enforcing their doctrines on others who do not agree 
with those doctrines.  In short, they seek a specific religious preference 
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BODENSTEINER-FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:56 PM 
948 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:4 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 948 
II. CATHOLIC BISHOPS’ LITIGATION ........................................................ 954 
III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES ............. 959 
IV. APPLICATION OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES TO 
CATHOLIC BISHOPS’ LITIGATION AND HOSANNA-TABOR ........ 966 
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 976 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than 130 years ago, and less than 100 years after the adoption 
of the First Amendment, the Court, in Reynolds v. United States, 
rejected a Free Exercise Clause1 challenge to a federal law that 
prohibited polygamy where the accused claimed that his Mormon 
religion required that he have multiple wives.2  Reynolds argued that the 
Free Exercise Clause required an exemption from otherwise valid 
criminal laws, but the Court rejected his argument.3  The Chief Justice of 
the Court wrote: 
[A]s a law of the organization of society under the exclusive 
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural 
marriages shall not be allowed.  Can a man excuse his practices 
to the contrary because of his religious belief?  To permit this 
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every 
citizen to become a law unto himself.  Government could exist 
only in name under such circumstances.4 
More than 100 years later, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court 
rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge to an Oregon law that 
included “religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general 
criminal prohibition on use of that drug” and permitted Oregon “to 
deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs 
because of such religiously inspired use.”5  Justice Scalia, writing for the 
Court, invoked Reynolds in reaching his conclusion: 
 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or [not of] the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
2. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–62, 167–68 (1878). 
3. Id. at 162, 164–67. 
4. Id. at 166–67 (emphasis added). 
5. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874, 890 (1990). 
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The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable 
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry 
out other aspects of public policy, “cannot depend on measuring 
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s 
spiritual development.”  To make an individual’s obligation to 
obey such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his 
religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is 
“compelling”—permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, “to 
become a law unto himself,”—contradicts both constitutional 
tradition and common sense.6 
Fast-forward to May 2012, approximately one month before the 
Supreme Court upheld the key provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA).7  The United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops (Catholic Bishops) spearheaded a religious-freedom 
attack8 on a provision of the PPACA that requires most health 
insurance plans to provide “essential health benefits,” including 
“[p]reventive and wellness services,” as defined by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services.9  There are a number of exemptions and 
safe-harbor provisions available to certain employers, including: an 
 
6. Id. at 885 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167). 
7. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012), upheld in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2600, 2608 (2012). 
8. There are a variety of lawsuits with different plaintiffs, including a few Catholic 
colleges and universities, but the complaints were obviously coordinated.  See, e.g., 
Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-00815 (D.D.C. 
filed May 21, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop], dismissed as not 
ripe, 920 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2013), appeal held in abeyance, 2013 WL 3357814 (D.C. Cir. 
June 21, 2013); Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Franciscan Univ. of Steubenville v. 
Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00440 (S.D. Ohio filed May 21, 2012), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 
2013 WL 1189854 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013); Complaint, Trautman v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-
00123 (W.D. Pa. filed May 21, 2012), dismissed as not ripe sub nom., Persico v. Sebelius, 919 
F. Supp. 2d 622 (W.D. Pa. 2013).  Since then, many more lawsuits have been filed and new 
decisions are issued regularly.  See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, 
2013 WL 6579764 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013).  The landscape of this litigation changes almost 
daily, so I will not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of either the cases or the decisions.  
Suffice it to say, the results have been mixed.  I wonder whether Pope Francis was thinking, at 
least in part, about these lawsuits when he commented in September 2013 about the Catholic 
Church being “obsessed” with abortion, gay marriage, and contraception.  Laurie Goodstein, 
Pope Says Church Is ‘Obsessed’ with Gays, Abortion, Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 
2013, at A1. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b) (Supp. V 2012); see also Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, 
HRSA.GOV, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
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exemption for “religious employers”;10 an exemption for 
“grandfathered” health plans;11 a temporary safe-harbor provision 
ensuring that no department will take enforcement action against non-
profit employers and their group health plans that “on and after 
February 10, 2012, do not provide some or all of the contraceptive 
coverage otherwise required, consistent with any applicable State law, 
because of the religious beliefs of the organization”;12 and an exemption 
for employers with fewer than fifty employees, which do not have to 
provide employees with a health insurance plan.13  Prior to the litigation 
organized by the Catholic Bishops, the Obama administration proposed 
a compromise,14 but that did not satisfy the Catholic Bishops,15 so they, 
and others, proceeded with the litigation.16  Several weeks after the 
litigation was initiated, the Catholic Health Association (CHA), 
comprised of 2,000 Catholic hospitals, health systems, and related 
organizations, expressed its deep concern about the compromise, even 
though it had initially supported it.17  Surveys suggest the Catholic 
 
10. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2012) (setting out the criteria for this exemption). 
11. Id. § 147.140(a)(1)(i).  Plans in which individuals were enrolled on March 23, 2010, 
are not subject to the preventive services provision.  Id. § 147.140(a)(1)(ii). 
12. See Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
16,501, 16,502–03 (proposed Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (providing a 
safe-harbor that “is in effect until the first plan year that begins on or after August 1, 2013”); 
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8727 
(Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (same). 
13. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
14. See Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Fact Sheet: Women’s Preventive Services 
and Religious Institutions, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
-press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions.  
The Fact Sheet states: 
Under the new policy to be announced today, women will have free preventive care 
that includes contraceptive services no matter where she works.  The policy also 
ensures that if a woman works for a religious employer with objections to providing 
contraceptive services as part of its health plan, the religious employer will not be 
required to provide, pay for or refer for contraception coverage, but her insurance 
company will be required to directly offer her contraceptive care free of charge. 
Id. 
15. See Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8; see also infra note 17 and 
accompanying text. 
16. See, e.g., Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8. 
17. Emily Douglas, Catholic Health Association Pulls Support from Contraception 
Mandate, THE NATION (June 20, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/168509/cath
olic-health-association-pulls-support-contraception-mandate.  The CHA listed its concerns in 
a letter to the Department of Health and Human Services.  Letter from Carol Keehan, 
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Bishops are presenting the “corporate” or institutional version of 
religious freedom, not the version of a substantial percentage of 
Catholics who use contraceptive devices.18 
This Article is not intended as an exhaustive brief for either side in 
the Catholic Bishops’ litigation, although it will question the Bishops’ 
legal position,19 as well as the purpose of the litigation.20  More generally, 
 
Robert V. Stanek, and Joseph R. Swedish, Catholic Health Ass’n., to Marilyn Tavenner, 
Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. 
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/201 
2/06/15/SocialIssues-Religion-Immigration/Graphics/061512CHAComments_ANPRM_Wom 
ensPreventiveServices.pdf. 
18. See RACHEL K. JONES & JOERG DREWEKE, COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL 
WISDOM: NEW EVIDENCE ON RELIGION AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE 3–8 (2011), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/Religion-and-Contraceptive-Use.pdf (noting that among 
“sexually active women who are not pregnant, postpartum or trying to get pregnant,” 68% of 
Catholic women in that universe used “highly effective methods”—32% sterilization, 31% 
pill, and 5% IUD).  In Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the Court gave Free 
Exercise Clause protection to Thomas’s version of what his religion, Jehovah’s Witness, 
required, not the institution’s “official” version.  Id. at 711, 715–16.  Are the Catholic Bishops 
asking the courts to impose the institutional version of Catholicism on the government at the 
expense of a substantial number of Catholics who disagree with that version and, in fact, want 
the benefit provided by the PPACA? 
19. Similar litigation by religious institutions challenging state laws that required 
employers providing group health insurance coverage to employees to include prescription 
contraceptives in the insurance coverage has been unsuccessful.  See, e.g., Catholic Charities 
of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 
(2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007). 
20. When I learned of the litigation, I questioned whether the race of the President 
played a role in the Catholic Bishops’ decision to initiate litigation, but I decided not to 
pursue that issue here.  More recently, I became aware of a brief article written by Most Rev. 
John R. Quinn, Archbishop Emeritus of San Francisco, addressing a “demand from many 
Catholic bishops and lay leaders that the University of Notre Dame rescind its invitation to 
President Obama to deliver the 2009 commencement address.”  John R. Quinn, A Critical 
Moment: Barack Obama, Notre Dame and the Future of the U.S. Church, AMERICA: NAT’L 
CATH. REV. (Mar. 30, 2009), http://americamagazine.org/issue/692/100/critical-moment.  
Archbishop Quinn stated that three “hard and penetrating questions” occurred to him.  Id.  
Most relevant here is the third: 
 3.  If the president is forced to withdraw, how will that fact be used?  Will it be 
used to link the church with racist and other extremist elements in our country?  
Will the banishment of the first African-American president from Catholic 
university campuses be seen as grossly insensitive to the heritage of racial hatred 
which has burdened our country for far too long?  Will it be used to paint the 
bishops as supporters of one political party over another?  Will this action be seen as 
proof that the bishops of the United States do not sincerely seek dialogue on major 
policy questions, but only acquiescence? 
Id.  Does the Catholic Bishops’ attack on PPACA raise the same “hard and penetrating” 
questions?  Incidentally, President Obama did deliver the 2009 commencement address at 
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this Article questions the validity of the expressed concern about 
religious freedom, or freedom of conscience as some express it.  In a 
country where at least mainstream religion enjoys substantial freedom, 
are the Catholic Bishops attempting “to become a law unto 
[themselves]”?21  Indeed, religious freedom is important, particularly for 
individuals, but when does governmental gerrymandering to 
accommodate one group’s religious beliefs or practices interfere with 
the freedom of others, including some members of the group? 
For example, does the decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, holding that the First 
Amendment requires a “ministerial exception” to federal 
antidiscrimination laws, restrict the freedom of the victims of such 
discrimination, including retaliation?22  Assuming Hosanna-Tabor gives 
religious institutions the freedom to discriminate on the basis of race,23 it 
limits the freedom of the victims of such discrimination.24  When 
religious employers seek a ministerial exception that would permit them 
to discriminate, for example, on the basis of race in filling certain 
positions, they are seeking “to become a law unto [themselves].”25 
If the Catholic Bishops are successful in their litigation and they are 
exempted from the challenged provisions of the PPACA, the freedom 
of non-Catholic employees of the exempt Catholic institutions, as well 
 
Notre Dame.  See Obama Notre Dame Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2009, 6:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/17/obama-notre-dame-f_n_204387.html.  Shortly after 
the election on November 6, 2012, Vincent Miller, the Gudorf Chair of Catholic Theology 
and Culture at the University of Dayton, wrote that “President Obama’s narrow victory 
among Catholic voters this week will be seen by many as a political loss for the U.S. Catholic 
bishops, who appeared to be openly opposing Obama during the presidential campaign.”  
Vincent Miller, My Take: Catholic Bishops’ Election Behavior Threatens Their Authority, 
CNN BELIEF BLOG (Nov. 8, 2012, 10:18 AM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/08/my-
take-catholic-bishops-election-behavior-threatens-their-authority.  While defending the 
Church’s right to conduct a campaign on religious liberty, Miller indicated that “its ‘Preserve 
Religious Freedom’ yard signs were clearly designed to be placed alongside partisan 
candidate signs.”  Id.  He also stated that “the bishops’ posture toward the administration 
during the election poses a major risk to the Church because it left the impression that there 
was only one legitimate Catholic choice for president—Mitt Romney.”  Id. 
21. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). 
22. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 
(2012); see also discussion infra Part IV. 
23. While Hosanna-Tabor did not involve race discrimination, it is not clear that the 
Court would treat race discrimination differently.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
24. A license to discriminate on the basis of race deprives some (usually racial 
minorities) of equal opportunity in employment, which is a denial of freedom. 
25. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167. 
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as the Catholic employees who have a different view of what it means to 
be Catholic—to choose when to procreate and when not to do so—will 
be limited.26  In effect, the Catholic Bishops are asking government to 
help enforce their anti-contraception rule by punishing those Catholics 
who choose to use prescription contraceptives.  Is requiring the “good” 
Catholic employees of a Catholic religious institution covered by the 
PPACA, who participate in its health insurance program but choose not 
to use the contraception benefit, to subsidize the “bad” Catholic 
employees, who use their health insurance to purchase prescriptive 
contraceptives, a greater infringement of religious freedom or freedom 
of conscience than the government-imposed obligation to support 
religious instruction or worship through an educational voucher 
program that benefits primarily Catholic elementary and secondary 
schools?27 
In short, the Catholic Bishops want to promote their institutional 
religious freedom even though that freedom is often at the expense of 
individuals’ freedom, including many Catholic women who support and 
 
26. Of course, they are free to purchase prescription contraceptives but not all women 
have the financial resources to do so.  The “non-conforming” Catholics are free to work for 
an employer that complies with the PPACA, just as the Catholic institutions are free to avoid 
becoming an “employer.”  See Contraceptive Coverage: Stories from the Front Lines, ASS’N 
OF REPROD. HEALTH PROF’LS, https://www.arhp.org/Policy-and-Advocacy/Policy-Recomme 
ndations/Contraceptive-Coverage/stories (last visited Apr. 2, 2014). 
27. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647, 681 (2002) (majority opinion & 
Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that in the 1999–2000 school year, 96% of all voucher 
recipients attended religious schools and that thirty-five of forty-six (76%) of the religious 
schools were Catholic).  The recently adopted Indiana school voucher program, An Act to 
Amend the Indiana Code Concerning Education, Pub. L. No. 92-2011, § 10, 2011 Ind. Acts 
1024 (codified as amended at IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013)), prohibits 
“eligible school[s]” from discriminating “on the basis of race, color, or national origin,” IND. 
CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-3(a), but it does not prohibit “religious instruction or activities” in the 
“eligible school[s],” id. § 20-51-4-1(a)(1).  Thus, one whose conscience or religious beliefs 
dictate that she not support Catholic religious instruction or activities is left with no choice, 
i.e., she must pay the taxes that support the “choice scholarship[s].”  See id. § 20-51-4-1(a)(1).  
The Court, in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, recognized that “[a] 
dissenter whose tax dollars are ‘extracted and spent’ knows that he has in some small measure 
been made to contribute to an establishment in violation of conscience.”  Ariz. Christian Sch. 
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 
(1968)); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“[C]ompelling an individual to support religion violates the fundamental principle of 
freedom of conscience.”). 
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would utilize the insurance required by the challenged provisions in the 
PPACA.28 
II. CATHOLIC BISHOPS’ LITIGATION 
Although there are many lawsuits, I will provide a brief description 
of one of them, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Sebelius, 
filed in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia.29  All of the 
plaintiffs in this case are corporations,30 emphasizing that this case is 
about the religious freedom of certain Catholic institutions that are 
 
28. See Ian Millhiser, Catholic Nuns File Brief Supporting Affordable Care Act, THINK 
PROGRESS (Feb. 23, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/02/23/431147 
/catholic-nuns-file-brief-supporting-affordable-care-act/. 
29. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8.  There are other lawsuits 
filed by individuals who own or operate for-profit employers and who claim they run the 
business in a manner consistent with their religious beliefs.  On November 26, 2013, the Court 
agreed to hear two of these cases—Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of U.S. 
Health and Human Services, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), 
and Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 678 (2013).  In the latter, the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction 
and remanded after deciding corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).  Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1121, 1128–29, 1147.  
In the former, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction, holding a for-
profit secular corporation could not assert a Free Exercise Clause claim, and it could not 
engage in religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore, could not assert a 
RFRA claim.  Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 388–89.  Further, the court held that the shareholders 
likely did not have a viable claim that implementation of the women’s preventive healthcare 
regulation under PPACA against the corporation violated their right to free exercise of 
religion.  Id.; see also Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2013), 
petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3318 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2013) (No. 13-591); Autocam Corp. v. 
Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the religion-based challenge to the 
mandated preventive and wellness provisions of the PPACA), petition for cert. filed, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 13-482); O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154, 1169 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (dismissing a challenge to the 
preventive services coverage provision of the PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (Supp. V. 
2012), based on the religion clauses and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, 
RFRA, and the Administrative Procedure Act); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 
1299 (D. Colo. 2012) (issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining federal officials and agencies 
from applying or enforcing the substantive requirement imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
13(a)(4), and the application of the penalties in 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D, 4980H (2012), and 29 
U.S.C. § 1132), aff’d, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 
3468 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2014) (No. 13-919). 
30. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8.  Other plaintiffs are The 
Consortium of Catholic Academies of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., Archbishop 
Carroll High School, Inc., Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., and The 
Catholic University of America.  Id. 
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employers,31 rather than individual Catholics.  The opening sentences in 
the complaint state: “This lawsuit is about one of America’s most 
cherished freedoms: the freedom to practice one’s religion without 
government interference.  It is not about whether people have a right to 
abortion-inducing drugs, sterilization, and contraception.”32  It goes on 
to say that government is free to make these services more readily 
available; however, “the Government seeks to require Plaintiffs—all 
Catholic entities—to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs by 
providing, paying for, and/or facilitating access to those services.”33 
These Catholic entities “provide a wide range of spiritual, 
educational, and social services to residents in the greater Washington, 
D.C., community, Catholic and non-Catholic alike.”34  Students enrolled 
in the archdiocesan schools “are taught faith—not just the basics of 
Christianity, but how to have a relationship with God that will remain 
with them after they leave their Catholic school.”35  In summarizing the 
work of the Archdiocese, the complaint says “[it]—and the entire 
Catholic Church—is committed to serving anyone in need, regardless of 
religion,” and “[i]n addition to serving individuals of all faiths, [it] also 
 
31. Id.  Any “religious employer” is exempt from the contraception services 
requirement.  See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2012); see also infra notes 134–35 and 
accompanying text.  “Religious employer” is defined as an organization that meets four 
criteria: (1) its purpose is the “inculcation of religious values”; (2) it employs primarily 
“persons who share [its] religious tenets”; (3) it “serves primarily persons who share [its] 
religious tenets”; and (4) it “is a nonprofit organization,” as described in the Internal 
Revenue Code.  45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B).  Further, only “large employers,” those 
with at least fifty employees, are covered by the requirement.  26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A). 
32. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶ 1. 
33. Id.  What exactly is the sincerely held religious belief of these entities—that 
Catholics should not use contraception, or that Catholics should neither use nor subsidize 
others’ use of contraception?  If it means the latter, is it improper for such an entity to pay 
wages to someone who uses the wages to purchase either contraception or an abortion?  It is 
not clear who is financing the litigation, but it is certainly possible that the contributions of 
individual Catholics who favor and support the challenged provisions of the PPACA are 
being utilized, contrary to their sincerely held beliefs, based on their version of Catholicism so 
that Catholic employers should make full benefits available to all employees. 
34. Id. ¶ 2. 
35. Id. ¶ 33.  The complaint does not indicate whether the archdiocesan schools receive 
government funds.  See generally id.  Government-funded education vouchers are available in 
Washington, D.C. and more than one-half of the students receiving vouchers attend Catholic 
schools.  Lyndsey Layton & Emma Brown, Quality Control on D.C. School Vouchers? ‘A 
Blind Spot.,’ WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2012, at A1.  Congress appropriated $20 million for the 
D.C. vouchers, id., so federal taxpayers are subsidizing Catholic schools in D.C. 
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employs individuals of all faiths.”36  If the Archdiocese “is committed to 
serving anyone in need, regardless of religion,” apparently it does not 
violate its “sincerely held religious beliefs” to subsidize activity that is 
sinful if engaged in by a Catholic.37 
In their complaint, the plaintiffs assert nine separate legal claims 
attacking the challenged law and regulations: a substantial burden on 
religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993 (RFRA)38 and the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment;39 excessive entanglement in violation of the Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment;40 religious 
discrimination in violation of the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the First Amendment;41 interference in matters of internal 
church governance in violation of the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the First Amendment;42 compelled speech in violation of the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment;43 and three counts alleging 
violations of the Administrative Procedure Act.44 
 
36. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 37–38.  What the 
complaint omits is the fact that the Archdiocese wants to be allowed to impose its religious 
beliefs related to prescriptive contraceptives on all of those students and employees.  See 
generally id.  Of course, no student is required by law to attend a Catholic school, and no one 
is required to work for a Catholic employer; similarly, no Catholic institution is required by 
law to establish a school or become an employer, or if it chooses to become an employer and 
has less than fifty employees, make health insurance available.  See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 4980H(c)(2)(A). 
37. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1, 37.  For example, it 
appears that a woman in need because she used her scarce resources to pay for an abortion 
would be eligible for assistance from the Archdiocese. 
38. Id. ¶¶ 177–93 (Count I); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006), invalidated as applied to states by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997). 
39. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 194–212 (Count II). 
40. Id. ¶¶ 213–22 (Count III). 
41. Id. ¶¶ 223–32 (Count IV) (claiming the “narrow exemption for certain ‘religious 
employers’ but not others discriminates on the basis of religious views or religious status”).  
This claim could be addressed by eliminating the “narrow exemption.” 
42. Id. ¶¶ 233–47 (Count V) (claiming the law interferes with the plaintiffs’ internal 
decisions in that the plaintiff institutions must comply with the decision of the Catholic 
Church on “these issues”).  This argument appears to be a stretch because the government is 
not interpreting church doctrine; rather, it is imposing a requirement that the plaintiffs say is 
inconsistent with church doctrine, as in Smith.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–80 
(1990). 
43. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 248–61 (Count VI) 
(claiming the law compels the plaintiffs “to subsidize, promote, and facilitate education and 
counseling services regarding [practices that violate their religious beliefs]”).  As a taxpayer in 
 
BODENSTEINER-FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:56 PM 
2014] CATHOLIC BISHOPS 957 
The Catholic Bishops’ claim that “the Government seeks to require 
Plaintiffs—all Catholic entities—to violate their sincerely held religious 
beliefs by providing, paying for, and/or facilitating access to those 
services,”45 if accurate, is the result of a series of non-government 
decisions made independent of PPACA.  Any alleged conflict between 
“sincerely held religious beliefs”46 and the requirements of the PPACA 
arises only because the Catholic entities decided voluntarily to become 
employers and provide health insurance, and because of “a series of 
independent decisions by health care providers and patients covered by 
[an employer’s] plan.”47  More than thirty years ago in United States v. 
Lee, the Court addressed conflicts created by the voluntary action of 
religious institutions: 
 
Indiana, I am compelled to support religious speech through the voucher program.  See IND. 
CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
44. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 262–305 (Counts VII–IX) 
(claiming violations of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D) (2012)). 
45. Id. ¶ 1. 
46. See id.  I will not address the question whether an entity, Catholic or otherwise, can 
have “sincerely held religious beliefs.”  A related question—“[c]an a corporation exercise 
religion?”—was raised but not resolved in Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. 
Colo. 2012) (referring to it as a question of first impression), aff’d, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 
2013), petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2014) (No. 13-919).  See also 
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing the denial of a preliminary 
injunction with instructions to enter such injunctions in favor of the two Catholic families and 
their closely held secular, for-profit corporations), petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3476 
(U.S. Feb. 6, 2014) (No. 13-937); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 627–28 (6th Cir. 
2013) (rejecting the religion-based challenge to the mandated preventive and wellness 
provisions of the PPACA), petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3318 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2013) (No. 
13-591); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 2013) (same), petition for cert. 
filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 13-482); O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1158 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (raising but declining “to reach the 
question of whether a secular limited liability company is capable of exercising a religion 
within the meaning of RFRA or the First Amendment”). 
47. See O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.  This analysis is similar to that used by the 
Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to 
education vouchers utilized by parents to pay for their children’s education in, for example, 
Catholic schools.  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (holding that 
the Ohio voucher program allows “individuals to exercise genuine choice among options 
public and private, secular and religious”).  The Court described the voucher system as a 
program “of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a 
result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals.”  Id. at 649.  Because of 
the “true private choice,” the Court said “no reasonable observer would think a neutral 
program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the 
numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur of 
government endorsement.”  Id. at 649, 655. 
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 Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs 
flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot 
be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every 
aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs.  When followers 
of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of 
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of 
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory 
schemes which are binding on others in that activity.  Granting 
an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates 
to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.  
Congress drew a line in [26 U.S.C.] § 1402(g), exempting the self-
employed Amish but not all persons working for an Amish 
employer.  The tax imposed on employers to support the social 
security system must be uniformly applicable to all, except as 
Congress provides explicitly otherwise.48 
More generally, the court in O’Brien v. U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services stated: 
However, the challenged regulations do not demand that 
plaintiffs alter their behavior in a manner that will directly and 
inevitably prevent plaintiffs from acting in accordance with their 
religious beliefs.  Frank O’Brien is not prevented from keeping 
the Sabbath, from providing a religious upbringing for his 
children, or from participating in a religious ritual such as 
communion.  Instead, plaintiffs remain free to exercise their 
religion, by not using contraceptives and by discouraging 
employees from using contraceptives.  The burden of which 
plaintiffs complain is that funds, which plaintiffs will contribute 
to a group health plan, might, after a series of independent 
decisions by health care providers and patients covered by 
[O’Brien Industrial Holdings’] plan, subsidize someone else’s 
participation in an activity that is condemned by plaintiffs’ 
religion.  This [c]ourt rejects the proposition that requiring 
indirect financial support of a practice, from which plaintiff 
himself abstains according to his religious principles, constitutes 
a substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise.49 
RFRA, according to the court in O’Brien, “is a shield, not a sword” and 
is “not a means to force one’s religious practices upon others.”50  
 
48. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (rejecting employer’s Free Exercise 
Clause challenge to forced payment of social security taxes). 
49. O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1159 (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim based on RFRA). 
50. Id. 
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Referring to the burden on the plaintiffs as remote, the court indicated 
that “the health care plan will offend plaintiffs’ religious beliefs only if 
an [O’Brien Industrial Holdings] employee (or covered family member) 
makes an independent decision to use the plan to cover counseling 
related to or the purchase of contraceptives.”51  In short, what the 
Catholic Bishops complain of actually happens as a result of a series of 
independent private decisions, not directly as a result of the 
requirements of PPACA and its implementing regulations. 
III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
With a few exceptions, the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment has not been a reliable source of religious freedom.  For 
nearly thirty years prior to the decision in Smith, plaintiffs relying on the 
Free Exercise Clause could point to Sherbert v. Verner to support their 
argument that claims based on the Free Exercise Clause trigger strict 
scrutiny.52  This is confirmed by several post-Sherbert cases challenging 
the denial of unemployment compensation benefits to individuals who 
lost their jobs for refusing to work in a manner that they believed was 
inconsistent with their religious beliefs.53  Between Sherbert and Smith, it 
was generally assumed that Free Exercise Clause claims trigger strict 
scrutiny, requiring the government to show a compelling interest and a 
close connection between its interest and the means utilized to achieve 
that interest.54  Nevertheless, despite the heavy burden that strict 
scrutiny supposedly imposes, the government was generally successful in 
defeating Free Exercise Clause claims that did not challenge the denial 
of unemployment compensation benefits.55  However, “hybrid” cases, 
such as Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the plaintiffs raised not only a Free 
Exercise Clause claim, but also a claim based on another constitutional 
provision (substantive due process in Yoder), were more successful.56 
 
51. Id. at 1160. 
52. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
53. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
54. See, e.g., Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141–42 (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. 707; Sherbert, 374 U.S. 
398). 
55. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen 
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
56. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208–09, 214, 234 (1972) (holding that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments preclude a state from forcing Amish parents to send their children, 
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The decision in Smith drastically changed the standard of review, if 
not the results, by substituting rational basis for strict scrutiny in cases 
where plaintiffs challenge religion-neutral laws of general applicability.57  
The Court stated: 
We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse 
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting 
conduct that the State is free to regulate.  On the contrary, the 
record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence 
contradicts that proposition. . . .  
 . . . [D]ecisions have consistently held that the right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on 
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that 
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”58 
Shortly after Smith, in 1993, Congress passed the RFRA, creating a 
statutory free exercise claim designed to restore the compelling interest 
test utilized in Sherbert and Yoder.59  However, a few years later in City 
of Boerne v. Flores, the Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as 
applied to state and local governments because Congress lacked the 
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to expand the 
scope of rights protected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 
 
who have graduated from eighth grade, to high school until the children reach the age of 
sixteen). 
57. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). 
58. Id. (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). 
59. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006)), invalidated as applied to states 
by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
60. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.  In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423, 425, 439 (2006), the Supreme Court applied RFRA to the federal 
government and held that the religious use of a tea for communion is protected, even though 
it appears on Schedule I of the Controlled Substance Act.  However, the Court did not 
expressly address whether RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal government.  Id. 
at 438–39.  While Gonzales may support a challenge to the contraception mandate in the 
PPACA, it is possible to give effect to both statutes by upholding the PPACA on the grounds 
that it does not impose a substantial burden on religion, and it is the least restrictive means of 
serving a compelling government interest.  See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 4–5 & n.4 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a RFRA challenge to the “individual mandate” portion of PPACA 
because it does not place a substantial burden on the exercise of plaintiffs’ Christian faith and, 
even if it does, it is the least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental interest), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012); see also United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th 
Cir. 2011); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958–59 (10th Cir. 2001); Newland v. Sebelius, 
881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296, 1299–300 (D. Colo. 2012) (issuing a preliminary injunction 
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The same year RFRA was passed, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court applied strict scrutiny and found a 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause because the city ordinance at issue 
was specifically aimed at the Santeria worship service.61  In other words, 
the city ordinance was neither religion-neutral nor a law of general 
applicability, and therefore, Smith did not control.62  Later, in Locke v. 
Davey, the Court rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge to a state 
scholarship program designed to assist academically gifted students with 
post-secondary education expenses, but the scholarship was not 
available to a student who pursued a degree in theology at an eligible 
educational institution.63  Here, the Court distinguished Lukumi, stating 
“[f]ar from evincing the hostility toward religion which was manifest in 
Lukumi, we believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship 
Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits.”64  
While the state could have funded the education at issue without 
violating the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution,65 the Court 
concluded that the state’s interest in not funding pursuit of a devotional 
degree, in light of the state constitutional provision prohibiting 
appropriation of public money “to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment,”66 is 
“substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor 
burden on Promise Scholars.”67 
In sum, since 1990 the Free Exercise Clause has not been a reliable 
source of religious freedom except in situations where government takes 
 
enjoining application of the contraception requirement in PPACA to the plaintiffs, based on 
the religious objections of the owners of a private, secular, for-profit corporation, and 
summarily concluding, based on Wilgus, that the RFRA is constitutional as applied to the 
federal government), aff’d, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2014) (No. 13-919).  RFRA addresses conflicts between it and 
other federal statutes and provides that subsequent laws are subject to RFRA “unless such [a] 
law explicitly excludes such application by reference to this chapter.”  Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b), invalidated as applied to states by Flores, 
521 U.S. 507. 
61. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 545–47 
(1993). 
62. See id. at 531–32 (“These ordinances fail to satisfy the Smith requirements.”). 
63. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004). 
64. Id. at 724 (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520). 
65. Id. at 719. 
66. Id. at 719 & n.2 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
67. Id. at 725. 
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direct aim at a particular religion or religion more generally.68  The 
“hybrid” cases provide little comfort because, in those relatively rare 
cases, religious freedom depends on other constitutional provisions, 
such as substantive due process in Yoder.69  After Flores and its narrow 
interpretation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a broad 
federal legislative fix aimed at state and local government is unlikely.70  
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, reasonable people can differ 
on whether Smith and its rational basis approach to religion-neutral, 
generally applicable rules provides the proper interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause.  The question is whether religious freedom really 
requires that all legislation be gerrymandered to avoid conflict with 
religious practices. 
In recent years, the Court has also limited the Establishment Clause 
as a source of religious freedom.  First, as the Court held in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, government is now free to subsidize religious 
instruction and worship under the guise of private choice in directing 
government-issued educational vouchers to religious schools.71  The 
Court had previously ruled in Mitchell v. Helms that government is free 
to provide materials and equipment to private religious schools with 
little concern about diversion of the government subsidy for use in 
furtherance of religious purposes.72  Justice O’Connor, along with Justice 
Breyer, supplied necessary votes in Mitchell, but expressed concern 
about actual diversion because of the absence of true private choice.73  
However, Justice O’Connor’s concern went away in Zelman because she 
 
68. During this period, the Supreme Court increased the constitutional protection of 
religious institutions by applying First Amendment freedom of speech and association 
principles.  See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see also 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978, 2995 (2010) (considering whether the 
First Amendment right of free speech was violated, but holding that denial of Registered 
Student Organization status to an organization that barred students based on religion and 
sexual orientation, in violation of the law school’s nondiscrimination policy, was viewpoint 
neutral and reasonable). 
69. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208–09, 214 (1972). 
70. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997).  More limited legislation, 
such as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-1 (2006), tied to federal financial assistance, offers some protection.  
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714, 726 (2005) (rejecting a facial Establishment Clause 
challenge to RLUIPA by a prison, but leaving open as-applied challenges). 
71. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). 
72. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 831, 835 (2000). 
73. Id. at 840–42 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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perceived the education vouchers as subsidizing private religious schools 
only by virtue of parental choice.74 
Second, government displays of religious symbols, such as the Ten 
Commandments, will not violate the Establishment Clause so long as 
the religious message is not dominant.75  This means government is free 
to display religious symbols, as long as it is careful to disguise its real 
purpose and include enough nonreligious content to discount the 
religious nature of the display.76  Another way for government to 
proliferate the display of religious symbols on its property is to create a 
limited public forum in which private parties are allowed to display 
items, including religious symbols.77  This is a bit risky because 
disfavored religions might decide to take advantage of the forum and 
display unpopular symbols.78  The recently expanded “government as 
speaker” concept may open another door for government displays, but 
the Court, in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, did not have to address 
the Establishment Clause implications.79 
Third, enforcement of the Establishment Clause has become more 
difficult because the Court has expanded the prudential limitation on 
standing in cases challenging government expenditures in support of 
religious institutions.  In Flast v. Cohen, the Court created an exception 
for Establishment Clause cases to the prudential limitation on taxpayer 
standing, i.e., the federal courts’ reluctance to hear cases asserting a 
“generalized grievance[]” in which the plaintiffs’ alleged injury flows 
 
74. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
75. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681–83, 691–92 (2005) (holding that a 
passive display of the Ten Commandments outside the state capitol surrounded by other 
monuments does not violate the Establishment Clause because even though it sends dual 
messages, religious and secular, the secular message predominates), with McCreary Cnty. v. 
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850, 869 (2005) (holding that display of the Ten Commandments 
on the walls in two county courthouses violated the Establishment Clause because the 
displays lacked a secular purpose). 
76. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
77. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758, 770 
(1995) (holding that precluding the Ku Klux Klan from erecting a large Latin cross in the 
park across from the Ohio Statehouse violated the Klan’s freedom of speech and allowing it 
would not violate the Establishment Clause). 
78. See id. 
79. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).  The Establishment 
Clause was “neither raised nor briefed.”  Id. at 485–86 (Souter, J., concurring).  Two Justices 
were confident that the park display at issue does “not violate any part of the First 
Amendment.”  Id. at 482–83 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).  Two other Justices noted 
that government speakers are bound by the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses.  Id. 
at 482 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring). 
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from their status as taxpayers.80  The exception is for cases where 
plaintiffs challenge “exercises of congressional power under the taxing 
and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution,” on the grounds 
that the spending at issue “exceeds specific constitutional limitations 
imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending 
power,” such as the Establishment Clause.81  As a result, in Flast, the 
plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with their federal court litigation 
seeking to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds, pursuant to Titles I 
and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,82 on the 
grounds that the funds were being used to finance instruction in 
religious schools, as well as the purchase of textbooks and other 
instructional material.83 
However, the Flast exception has been narrowed to the point that it 
covers nothing other than Flast itself.84  Most recently, in Arizona 
Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, the Court held that 
Arizona taxpayers do not have standing to challenge Arizona tax credits 
for contributions to school tuition organizations that provide 
scholarships to students attending private schools, many of which are 
religious.85  Flast did not control because it provided a narrow exception 
for “governmental expenditures,” not tax credits, because the 
contributions to the private religious schools “result[ed] from the 
 
80. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102–06 (1968). 
81. Id. at 102–03. 
82. Id. at 85 (citing Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–
10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941 (2012))). 
83. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85, 87. 
84. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (denying 
standing for plaintiffs to challenge expenditures by the President as part of the Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives program, with three Justices saying Flast is limited to specific 
congressional appropriations and does not include executive expenditures from a general 
appropriation, and two Justices saying Flast should be overruled); Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 480–82 (1982) 
(holding that taxpayers lack standing to challenge a federal government decision to transfer 
property to a religious institution, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, because it is not an 
“expenditure”); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 211, 227–28 
(1974) (holding that citizen and taxpayer standing is denied to plaintiffs seeking to enjoin 
members of Congress from serving in the military reserves, based on Article I, Section 6, and 
noting that “[o]ur system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the political 
processes”); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167, 175 (1974) (holding that a 
taxpayer lacked standing to challenge the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as 
inconsistent with Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, because his challenge was not based on the 
taxing or spending power). 
85. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011). 
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decisions of private taxpayers regarding their own funds.”86  As stated by 
Justice Kagan, dissenting in Winn, “the Court’s arbitrary distinction 
threatens to eliminate all occasions for a taxpayer to contest the 
government’s monetary support of religion.”87 
On a brighter note, by a slim margin, government-sponsored prayer 
was found to violate the Establishment Clause when made part of 
graduation ceremonies in Lee v. Weisman,88 and when it was made part 
of the opening ceremonies at high school football games in Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe.89  Of course, the decision in Zelman, 
approving education vouchers, opens the door to government 
subsidizing prayer and religious worship at private religious schools.90 
While there are restrictions on government-sponsored prayer as part 
of government activities, the amount of government subsidies provided 
to religious institutions is staggering.91  Justice O’Connor touched on this 
in her concurring opinion in Zelman, in which she said the $8.2 million 
of public funds that flowed to religious schools in Cleveland in one year 
“is no small sum, [but] it pales in comparison to the amount of funds 
that federal, state, and local governments already provide religious 
institutions.”92  She then summarized the ways in which government 
subsidizes religious institutions, with some indications of the amount of 
money at stake.93 
Although the Establishment Clause is supposed to be a co-guarantor 
of religious freedom,94 it no longer does much of the heavy lifting.  
 
86. Id. at 1447–48.  This reasoning appears to expand the rationale in Zelman, which 
allows government to circumvent the Establishment Clause by involving private citizens in 
the process of directing government funds to religious institutions.  See Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).  Justice Kagan, in dissent, says this “novel 
distinction . . . has as little basis in principle as it has in our precedent” because “[e]ither way, 
the government has financed the religious activity.”  Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
87. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
88. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
89. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315, 317 (2000). 
90. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662–63. 
91. See id. at 665–68 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
92. Id. at 665. 
93. Id. at 665–68.  For example, Justice O’Connor refers to the numerous income and 
property tax deductions and exemptions, as well as federal health and education dollars, 
available to religiously affiliated organizations.  Id. 
94. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring); see also McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881–82 
(2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Maybe those truly interested in religious freedom should spend more 
resources promoting a robust Establishment Clause, rather than 
attempting to place themselves above the law.  Neither the Catholic 
Bishops nor the church in Hosanna-Tabor appears concerned about 
government subsidizing religion. 
IV. APPLICATION OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES TO 
CATHOLIC BISHOPS’ LITIGATION AND HOSANNA-TABOR 
The Court, in Hosanna-Tabor, adopted a “ministerial exception” to 
the application of the retaliation provision in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) to a religious institution.95  In short, the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit on 
behalf of Ms. Perich, a teacher at a small school operated by Hosanna-
Tabor, alleging that she had been fired in retaliation for threatening to 
file an ADA lawsuit.96  Hosanna-Tabor alleged that it discharged her for 
“‘insubordination and disruptive behavior’ . . . as well as . . . damage she 
had done to her ‘working relationship’ with the school by ‘threatening to 
take legal action.’”97  In seeking summary judgment, Hosanna-Tabor 
claimed Perich was a minister who had been fired for a religious 
reason—“that her threat to sue the Church violated the Synod’s belief 
that Christians should resolve their disputes internally.”98  The trial court 
agreed that the suit was barred by the ministerial exception; however, 
the court of appeals reversed, stating that Perich did not qualify as a 
minister because her duties as a “called” teacher were identical to her 
duties as a lay teacher.99 
In a unanimous decision, with several concurring opinions, the Court 
sided with Hosanna-Tabor: 
 We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.  The 
members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their 
ministers.  Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted 
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon 
 
95. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 701, 
710 (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006). 
96. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700–01. 
97. Id. at 700 (quoting Joint Appendix at 55, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-
553), 2011 WL 2940670, at *55). 
98. Id. at 701. 
99. Id. (citing EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 
769, 778–81 (6th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 
582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 891–92 (E.D. Mich. 2008)). 
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more than a mere employment decision.  Such action interferes 
with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church 
of control over the selection of those who will personify its 
beliefs.  By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes 
the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right 
to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.  
According the state the power to determine which individuals 
will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment 
Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such 
ecclesiastical decisions.100 
Even though the Court recognized that the ADA prohibition on 
retaliation is a valid and neutral law of general applicability, it held that 
Smith does not control the case because it “involved government 
regulation of only outward physical acts,” while this case “concern[ed] 
government interference with an internal church decision that affect[ed] 
the faith and mission of the church itself.”101 
Instead of relying on Smith, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor relied on 
two other cases.102  In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in North America, the Court held that applying a New 
York statute to determine which archbishop had the right to use a 
cathedral violated the First Amendment because the controversy over 
the right to use the cathedral was “strictly a matter of ecclesiastical 
government.”103  In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States 
and Canada v. Milivojevich, the Court overturned an Illinois Supreme 
Court decision purporting to reinstate a removed bishop because the 
proceedings resulting in his removal failed to comply with church laws 
and regulations.104  The Court reversed the state supreme court because 
it had “unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially 
religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits 
exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals” of the church.105  These 
 
100. Id. at 706. 
101. Id. at 707 (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).  The Court referred 
to its language in Smith “distinguishing the government’s regulation of ‘physical acts’ from its 
‘lend[ing] its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or 
dogma.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 877). 
102. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704–05 (relying on Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese 
for U.S. and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), and Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas 
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)). 
103. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 95–97, 115, 119. 
104. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 719–20. 
105. Id. at 720. 
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cases, according to the Court, “confirm that it is impermissible for the 
government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its 
ministers.”106 
After concluding that the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
require a ministerial exception to at least some cases brought under a 
federal antidiscrimination law, the Court had to decide whether the 
exception applies in the Hosanna-Tabor situation.107  First, the Court 
concluded that the “exception is not limited to the head of a religious 
congregation,” but the Court did not “adopt a rigid formula for deciding 
when an employee qualifies as a minister.”108  Rather, the Court simply 
concluded that “the exception covers [Ms.] Perich, given all the 
circumstances of her employment.”109  Several factors led to this 
conclusion:  the formal title, “Minister of Religion, Commissioned”; the 
substance reflected in the title—“a significant degree of religious 
training followed by a formal process of commissioning”; and the 
important religious functions Ms. Perich performed for the church—
“conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission,” 
“‘lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity,’” and “‘teach[ing] 
faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity 
and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church.’”110  Ironically, determining who is a minister, for purposes of 
applying the ministerial exception, brings the courts much closer to 
deciding religious doctrine than does the determination of whether a 
particular prohibited characteristic, such as race, sex, or disability, was a 
motivating factor in the challenged adverse employment action.111 
The Court identified three errors committed by the court of 
appeals—the failure to find relevance in the fact that Perich was a 
commissioned minister, according “too much weight to the fact that lay 
teachers at the school performed the same religious duties as Perich,” 
and placing too much emphasis on the amount of time Perich spent 
performing religious functions.112  Although Perich abandoned her claim 
for reinstatement, the Court found that immaterial because she 
 
106. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704. 
107. Id. at 707. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 707–08 (alterations in original) (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 97, at 
48). 
111. See Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 1008–12 (2013). 
112. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708–09. 
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“continue[d] to seek frontpay in lieu of reinstatement, backpay, 
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.”113  Such relief, 
according to the Court, would have required a determination that 
Hosanna-Tabor was wrong in discharging Perich, and the relief would 
constitute a penalty on Hosanna-Tabor for discharging an unwanted 
minister.114 
In response to the suggestion “that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted 
religious reason for firing Perich—that she violated the Synod’s 
commitment to internal dispute resolution—was pretextual,” the Court 
stated that the “suggestion misses the point” because the “purpose of 
the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister 
only when it is made for a religious reason,” rather, the exception 
“ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the 
faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical,’—is the church’s alone.”115  In 
an apparent attempt to limit its decision, the Court stated: 
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought 
on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire 
her.  Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such 
a suit.  We express no view on whether the exception bars other 
types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of 
contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.116 
Despite the Court’s attempt to limit its decision to the situation 
presented by Ms. Perich’s discharge,117 the decision certainly has the 
potential to disrupt enforcement of all federal antidiscrimination laws, 
as well as other state and federal employment laws.  Extending the 
notion of what constitutes a minister to reach teachers like Perich opens 
the door to job descriptions giving a wide range of employees “a role in 
conveying the [religious organization’s] message and carrying out its 
mission.”118  Religious organizations already have a statutory exemption, 
in Title VII and the ADA, that allows them to discriminate on the basis 
of religion,119 and now the Court has opened the door to a broad 
 
113. Id. at 709. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)). 
116. Id. at 710. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 708. 
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1 (2006) (Title VII).  In Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–39 (1987), the Court 
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constitutional exemption from cases alleging discrimination based on 
race, gender, national origin, disability, and age. 
When combined with the fact that “small” employers are exempted 
from the federal antidiscrimination laws,120 religious institutions may 
now have a broad license to discriminate.  For example, what would the 
Court do with a Title VII claim brought by a fully qualified Lutheran 
minister whose application for a real ministerial position was rejected 
because of his race?  It is not clear that the analysis in Hosanna-Tabor 
would lead to a different result.  The end of the Court’s opinion in 
Hosanna-Tabor suggests the rejected minister would lose121: 
 The interest of society in the enforcement of employment 
discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important.  But so too is 
the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their 
beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.  When a 
minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her 
termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck 
the balance for us.  The church must be free to choose those who 
will guide it on its way.122 
If the First Amendment has really “struck the balance for us,” 
presumably the Court would refuse to allow society’s great interest in 
eliminating race discrimination in employment to trump the First 
Amendment interest in religious freedom.123  Of course, a court with a 
different view of race discrimination could conclude that the Thirteenth 
Amendment, along with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “has struck the balance for us.”124  At least in cases where, 
for example, race or sex discrimination in the selection of a minister is 
 
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to this exemption, even as applied to nonreligious 
jobs.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (ADA).  In Hosanna-Tabor, Ms. 
Perich filed a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the 
ADA.  EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 775 (6th 
Cir. 2010).  The lawsuit filed on her behalf by the EEOC alleged “retaliation for threatening 
to file an ADA lawsuit.”  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701.  Both the EEOC and Perich 
argued, and Hosanna-Tabor did not dispute, that the religious exemptions in the ADA do not 
apply to retaliation claims.  Id. at 701 n.1. 
120. Employers with less than fifteen employees are exempted from Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006), and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A), and those with less than twenty employees are exempted from 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012). 
121. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
122. Id. 
123. See id. 
124. See, e.g., id.; Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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not tied to religious doctrine, it is not obvious why the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment should trump the equality principle reflected in 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.125 
The brief Establishment Clause portion of the decision in Hosanna-
Tabor, holding that “[a]ccording the state the power to determine which 
individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment 
Clause,”126 is a bit curious.  While that statement may be true, it does not 
fit the facts because the antidiscrimination laws do not really give “the 
state the power to determine which individuals will [be employed]” by 
religious institutions.127  Rather, under those laws, employers retain wide 
discretion in determining whom their employees will be, losing only the 
discretion to discriminate “because of” certain prohibited factors.128 
The common thread between the Catholic Bishops’ litigation and 
Hosanna-Tabor is that the religious institutions in both cases are seeking 
an exemption from religion-neutral, employment-related laws of general 
applicability, i.e., seeking “to become a law unto [themselves].”129  In 
both situations, the religious institution has opted to get into the 
business of employing people, but having done so, it does not want to 
 
125. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIII–XIV; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V 
2012).  In Smith, the Court recognized that applying strict scrutiny to free exercise claims 
“would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic 
obligations of almost every conceivable kind—ranging from compulsory military service 
to . . . laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races.”  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 888–89 (1990) (internal citation omitted) (citing Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603–04; 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)). 
126. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.  Most cases addressing government involvement 
in the resolution of internal disputes of religious institutions refer to the First Amendment, 
without identifying a specific clause.  See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597, 602 (1979).  
However, some cases also refer to the “free exercise of religion.”  See, e.g., Presbyterian 
Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
449 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 
344 U.S. 94, 115–16 (1952); Askew v. Trs. of the Gen. Assembly of the Church of the Lord 
Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2012).  Both the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause seem relevant. 
127. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
128. In discrimination cases, the courts do not act as a super-human resources 
department or personnel board “charged with evaluating the general quality of employment 
decisions.”  Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 922 (7th Cir. 2007); see also 
Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 697 (7th Cir. 2006). 
129. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878); see also Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. 
Ct. at 701, 707; Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 134, 155, 226. 
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play by the rules governing other employers.130  Hosanna-Tabor wanted 
to be treated differently than other employers, i.e., it sought, and 
obtained from the Supreme Court, an exemption that allows it to 
discriminate and retaliate in at least some circumstances.131 
The Catholic Bishops seek a similar exemption from a provision in 
the PPACA132 that requires non-grandfathered plans and issuers to 
provide, among other preventive services identified in guidelines 
adopted by Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), 
contraceptive services.133  The guidelines include a note referring to a 
regulation authorizing HRSA to establish exemptions from the 
contraceptive-services requirement for health plans established and 
maintained by “religious employers.”134  A “religious employer” is 
defined as an organization that meets four criteria: (1) its purpose is the 
“inculcation of religious values”; (2) it employs primarily “persons who 
share [its] religious tenets”; (3) it “serves primarily persons who share 
[its] religious tenets”; and (4) it “is a nonprofit organization,” as 
described in the Internal Revenue Code.135  As stated above, the ADA 
provides a statutory defense for religious entities, allowing them to give 
a “preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to 
 
130. The Catholic organizations challenging the contraceptive-services requirement not 
only opted to get in the business of employing people, they also opted to get in the business of 
providing health coverage.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  In commenting on 
proposed final rules related to the controversial requirement, “[s]ome religiously-affiliated 
employers warned that, if the definition of religious employer is not broadened, they could 
cease to offer health coverage to their employees in order to avoid having to offer coverage to 
which they object on religious grounds.”  Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers 
Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8727 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
131. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701, 710. 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (Supp. V 2012) (“A group health plan and a health 
insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum 
provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for— . . . (4) with 
respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph 
(1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph.”). 
133. See Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, supra note 9.  The HHS Guidelines for 
Health Insurance Coverage require “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all 
women with reproductive capacity.”  Id. 
134. Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A) (2012). 
135. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B).  In the complaint, four of the plaintiffs allege that 
none of them qualify for this exemption, and the fifth says it is unclear whether the 
government will conclude that it qualifies for this exemption.  Complaint, Roman Catholic 
Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 40, 54, 63, 73, 89. 
BODENSTEINER-FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:56 PM 
2014] CATHOLIC BISHOPS 973 
perform work connected with the carrying on by such [an entity] of its 
activities,”136 and allowing them to “require that all applicants and 
employees conform to the religious tenets of such [an entity].”137  
Therefore, both of the laws at issue, PPACA and ADA, include 
exemptions for religious organizations, but neither Hosanna-Tabor nor 
the Catholic Bishops are satisfied with the exemptions. 
Another common thread between the Catholic Bishops’ litigation 
and Hosanna-Tabor may be the organizations’ insensitivity to gender 
equity in the workplace.138  As noted by Professor Griffin in her article, 
The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, the victims of the ministerial exception are 
frequently women.139  The comments accompanying the final rules 
implementing the contraception-services requirement state: “Congress 
determined that both existing health coverage and existing preventive 
services recommendations often did not adequately serve the unique 
health needs of women” and that the “disparity places women in the 
workforce at a disadvantage compared to their male co-workers.”140  
Further, the contraceptive coverage requirement is “designed to serve 
the compelling public health and gender equity goals” identified 
above.141  In fact, this requirement will actually save money for the 
employers.142 
The Catholic Bishops attempt to avoid the holding in Smith by 
“arguing” in their complaint that the contraception requirement is “not 
a neutral law of general applicability because it is riddled with 
exemptions for which there is not a consistent, legally defensible basis,” 
in that “[i]t offers multiple exemptions from its requirement that 
employer-based health plans include or facilitate coverage for abortion-
inducing drugs, sterilization, contraception, and related education and 
 
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); see also supra note 119 and 
accompanying text. 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(2).  The parties agreed that these exemptions do not apply to 
retaliation claims.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 701 n.1 (2012). 
138. Griffin, supra note 111, at 990–92. 
139. Id. 
140. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
141. Id. at 8729. 
142. Id. at 8727 (citing a 2000 study estimating “that it would cost employers 15 to 17 
percent more not to provide contraceptive coverage in employee health plans than to provide 
such coverage, after accounting for both the direct medical costs of pregnancy and the 
indirect costs such as employee absence and reduced productivity”). 
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counseling,” and “because it discriminates against certain religious 
viewpoints and targets certain religious organizations for disfavored 
treatment”143  This argument is not convincing.144  However, the absence 
of a convincing argument did not prevent the Court from distinguishing 
Smith in Hosanna-Tabor.145  Although it conceded that “the ADA’s 
prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use, is a 
valid and neutral law of general applicability,” the Court said, “a 
church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of 
peyote” because the latter is simply an “outward physical” act.146  In 
contrast, Hosanna-Tabor “concerns government interference with an 
internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church 
itself.”147  This analysis is suspect for the reasons stated by Professor 
Griffin.148 
But, even if the Court is correct in Hosanna-Tabor, does its 
analysis—“outward physical acts” versus the “internal church decision 
that affects the faith and mission of the church itself”—distinguish Smith 
in the cases challenging the contraception requirement in the Catholic 
 
143. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 200–01. 
144. It is interesting that the plaintiffs, who seek a larger exemption for religious 
employers, use the existing exemption as the basis for the argument that the PPACA is not a 
religion-neutral law of general applicability.  Id. ¶¶ 134, 155 (noting that “the U.S. 
Government Mandate contains a narrow religious exemption,” which burdens their practice 
of faith and that at a minimum, the Government could provide a “broader exemption for 
religious employers”).  One way to understand whether a law satisfies the Smith criterion is to 
contrast it with the ordinance at issue in Lukumi.  Compare Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 874 (1990) (deciding the issue of whether Oregon’s drug laws violated members of the 
Native American Church’s constitutional rights when those members ingested peyote as part 
of a sacramental ceremony), with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 524, 526 (1993) (deciding the issue of whether Hialeah’s city ordinance 
prohibiting unnecessary animal killings violated members of the Santeria church’s 
constitutional rights when Santerian ceremonies include animal sacrifice).  Clearly the 
PPACA is more like the Oregon drug laws at issue in Smith than the ordinance at issue in 
Lukumi, which was aimed at a particular religious group and its animal sacrifice ritual.  See 
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524, 526. 
145. See Griffin, supra note 111, at 992–94; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012). 
146. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 877). 
147. Id. 
148. See Griffin, supra note 111, at 992–94 (“What could ‘affect[] the faith and mission of 
the church itself’ more than punishing individuals like Smith for participation in a religious 
ritual?  And what ‘internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church 
itself’ is involved in the firing of a disabled employee in a church that does not preach 
disabilities discrimination?” (alteration in original) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 
707)). 
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Bishops’ litigation?149  In Smith, the Court said the “right of free exercise 
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid 
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”150  Unless the right of free exercise means something 
different for a religious “institution” than it means for an “individual,” 
this sentence should end the discussion.  It does not appear that the 
litigation supported by the Catholic Bishops will require the courts to 
get involved in the selection of ministers or the interpretation of 
Catholic faith and doctrine. 
Unlike the plaintiff in Smith, the Catholic institutions challenging the 
PPACA in the litigation organized by the Catholic Bishops have a claim 
based on RFRA.151  This Act, found unconstitutional in Flores as applied 
to state and local government,152 attempts to restore strict scrutiny 
analysis to Free Exercise Clause claims, and the Court has not decided 
whether RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal government.153  
At least one court of appeals has rejected a RFRA claim in a case 
challenging the “individual mandate” portion of the PPACA.154 
 
149. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.  Hopefully, the Court is not saying “religious 
individuals must obey neutral laws of general applicability” but religious institutions do not.  
See Griffin, supra note 111, at 992. 
150. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). 
151. Compare Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 177–93, with 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
152. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (noting that even Congress’ broad powers under 
the Fourteenth Amendment could not justify the RFRA).  This is because the source of 
power relied upon by Congress to regulate state and local government was Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Court concluded that Congress exceeded its Section 5 power 
because the RFRA greatly expanded the First Amendment free exercise right, as defined in 
Smith.  Flores, 521 U.S. at 519, 534–36 (1997). 
153. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 4–5 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a RFRA 
challenge to the “individual mandate” portion of PPACA because it does not place a 
substantial burden on the exercise of plaintiffs’ Christian faith and, even if it does, it is the 
least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental interest), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
63 (2012); see also Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296, 1298–99 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining application of the contraception requirement in 
PPACA to the plaintiffs based on the religious objections of the owners of a private, secular, 
for-profit corporation, and summarily concluding, based on Wilgus, that the RFRA is 
constitutional as applied to the federal government), aff’d, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013), 
petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2014) (No. 13-919). 
154. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 4–5. 
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In sum, the claims asserted in the Catholic Bishops’ sponsored 
litigation challenging the contraception services requirement imposed 
by PPACA and implementing regulations should face an uphill battle, at 
least under current interpretation of the First Amendment.  Of course, 
the same was true of the challenge in Hosanna-Tabor, which resulted in 
a unanimous decision in favor of the religious institution.155  Hosanna-
Tabor confirms that “separation of church and state,” at least as 
understood until the Rehnquist Court began to shrink the 
Establishment Clause, is clearly a doctrine of the past.156  It remains to 
be seen whether RFRA will trump the controversial provision in the 
PPACA.157 
V. CONCLUSION 
My initial reaction to the decision in Smith was that the Court got it 
wrong.  I thought that Free Exercise Clause claims should trigger strict 
scrutiny so non-mainstream religions, those least powerful in the 
political process,158 would have a better chance of protecting themselves 
through litigation.  A few years after Smith, the decision in Lukumi 
provided some comfort, as the Court held that strict scrutiny still 
controls Free Exercise Clause challenges to laws that are neither 
religion-neutral nor of general applicability.159  It also became apparent, 
 
155. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 
(2012). 
156. See supra Part III (discussing the Court’s recent holdings on the Establishment 
Clause). 
157. See supra note 60. 
158. The Court in Smith recognized that: 
[L]eaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative 
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that 
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system 
in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social 
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).  It may be that RFRA undermines this 
concern, although RFRA generated broad support because mainstream religions prefer a 
broad interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause as it gives them a hammer they can use in 
the legislative process.  See Richard T. Foltin, Reconciling Equal Protection and Religious 
Liberty, 39 HUM. RTS., Jan. 2013, at 2. 
159. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 
(1993).  Such laws, which target a particular religion because of animosity toward it or its 
practices, or both, should also violate the Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted in Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996), which held that laws “born of animosity toward the class 
of persons affected” violate equal protection because there is no legitimate governmental 
purpose, id. 
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as religions proliferated in this country, that imposing on legislative 
bodies the equivalent of a religious impact statement for each piece of 
legislation could make it very difficult to govern.160  Further, the tension 
between the two religion clauses increases as the Free Exercise Clause 
gets larger, i.e., Establishment Clause concerns are greater when the 
Free Exercise Clause is interpreted as requiring religion-based 
exemptions from religion-neutral laws of general applicability.161  
Finally, the shrinking of the Establishment Clause, to the point that 
there are virtually no constitutional checks on governmental subsidies to 
religious institutions, should be accompanied by fewer Constitution-
imposed exemptions for religious institutions to avoid giving such 
institutions an advantage over competing nonreligious institutions.  For 
example, the Catholic institutions that are plaintiffs in the litigation 
promoted by the Catholic Bishops may be subsidized by the 
government, like their nonreligious competition, but they are seeking an 
advantage in the form of an exemption from certain requirements of the 
PPACA.162  For these reasons, I have changed my view of Smith. 
The proliferation of exemptions over the years has created a sense of 
entitlement.  When religious institutions are not successful in obtaining 
an exemption through the legislative process, they may seek a First 
Amendment-based exemption from the courts, as in Hosanna-Tabor.163  
Further, when religious institutions are partially successful in obtaining 
exemptions through the legislative process, as they were with PPACA, 
 
160. In rejecting strict scrutiny in Smith, the Court said any society that applies strict 
scrutiny across the board “to all actions thought to be religiously commanded[] . . . would be 
courting anarchy” and “that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of 
religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.”  Smith, 494 U.S. 
at 888. 
161. My concern about establishment problems when government exempts religious 
institutions from such laws is not shared by the current Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714, 726 (2005) (holding that section 3 of the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 3, 114 Stat. 803, 804 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2006)), insofar as it requires accommodation of religious 
practices in prisons, does not violate the Establishment Clause); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 
712, 719 (2004) (referring to the “play in the joints” between the two clauses (quoting Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
162. See Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶¶ 134, 155, 226.  
Similarly, in Hosanna-Tabor, the religious institution sought, and obtained, an exemption 
from federal anti-discrimination laws governing employers.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 701, 707, 710 (2012). 
163. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701. 
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they are free to seek additional exemptions from the courts.164  This is 
what the Catholic Bishops are doing.  Hopefully, the courts will 
understand that the Catholic Bishops are really seeking a religious 
preference and block their efforts. 
 
164. Ironically, as pointed out earlier, the Catholic Bishops’ attempt to use the 
exemptions provided by the legislature against the government is an attempt to show that the 
PPACA is not a neutral law.  See Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, 
¶¶ 200–01; see also supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
